This is an account of the battle of Kham Duc, one of the least known and most misunderstood battles in the American Phase of the Second Indochina War (1959 to 1975). At the time it was painted as a major American defeat, but this new history tells the full story.

The authors have a unique ability to reassess this battle – one was present at the battle, the other was briefed on it prior to retaking the site two years later. The book is based on exhaustive research, revisiting Kham Duc, interviewing battle veterans, and reading interview transcripts and statements of other battle participants, including former North Vietnamese Army (NVA) officers.

Based on their research, the authors contend that Kham Duc did not “fall” and was not “overrun.” In fact, it was a successful effort to inflict mass attrition on a major NVA force with minimum U.S. losses by voluntarily abandoning an anachronistic little tripwire border camp serving as passive bait for General Westmoreland's "lure and destroy" defensive tactics, as at Khe Sanh.