18 July 2024
Kevin Benson, author of Expectation of Valor, writes about the detailed planning that occurred in 2002-2003 prior to and during the start of the war in Iraq.
We had the opportunity to speak with Kevin about his upcoming book as well as his experiences as a U.S. Army Commander.
Casemate: Kevin, why did you write Expectation of Valor?
Benson: In February 2011, after I returned from a second extended stay in Baghdad, I was invited to attend a conference at the US Institute of Peace, in Washington, DC. The purpose of the conference was to capture observations from our (what we thought) soon to be completed operation in Iraq.
The intent was to apply these observations into planning considerations for the anticipated conclusion of operations in Afghanistan. The keynote speaker of the event stated that at the beginning of the war in Iraq “ill-informed planners” put commanders in positions where they only had bad options to select. This reinforced the trope that “the Army did no planning” for “Phase IV.” Having been the lead planner for the ground forces of Operation Iraqi Freedom I was, frankly, quite angry at this statement. In that moment I resolved to write about the planning for the war.
What are some highlights from your career before you arrived at Third Army headquarters in 2002? Were you prepared for the job of lead planner for a field army?
Benson: From the time I graduated from West Point in 1977, until the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, my career was “typical” of a Cold War officer. I served in tactical units as a platoon leader, company commander, battalion operations officer, executive officer, and I also had an assignment in Washington, DC.
After I returned from Europe in 1989, Army life accelerated. I missed the first Gulf War; however, I was selected to attend the School of Advanced Military Studies from 1991 to 1992. From 1992, until I arrived at Third Army in the summer of 2002, I served as a planner at an Army corps, a regimental executive officer, a planner at Third Army, had the privilege of commanding a tank battalion in the 1st Cavalry Division, and attended the Security Studies Program at MIT.
I had a range of experiences and formal military education that made me think on a wider scale. I’d given presentations to chiefs of defense staff of other nations, U.S. Senators and Representatives, as well as congressional staffs, and, of course, senior US Army general officers, three and four stars.
In the history of the US Army there are multiple examples of officers who went to war for the first time as senior officers. I was one of those. I’d not gone to war, but I did feel I was ready.
What were the primary sources you used in writing your book?
Benson: My primary sources were the daily reports I wrote to my commanding general and my personal journal. Every day, from the time I arrived at Third Army until the day I left the headquarters, I wrote a report to my commander and the other senior leaders on the staff concerning the state of the planning effort. The reports captured the events of the day, our dealings with coalition partners, our U.S. counterparts in the Navy, Marines Corps and Air Force, and my assessment of how we were meeting the milestones of preparing for our major operations plan.
I also kept a personal journal, wrote in the journal every day, and put down what I was feeling at the time and recorded any salient observations from the day. In my journal, I tried to capture the tension of planning, dealing with questions from DC, CENTCOM, the Army staff, all while trying to develop a sound and complete plan for operations in Iraq.
Now, I also referred to several books, which are in the bibliography. For example, I mentioned Eliot Cohen’s book, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime. As I read Cohen’s book, I suspected that senior leaders in the Pentagon did not actually read it but had an action officer read it and write up an executive summary. The book was much more sophisticated than what appeared. It seemed that policy makers felt Soldiers could only think inside a small box and required constant prodding to expand their horizons. My reply was that my planner’s box was bounded by Newtonian physics, it takes time to move mass over distance.
I did actually bring books to the theater of operations, e.g.; Cohen’s book, Military Misfortunes, Raphael Patai’s, The Arab Mind, and Clausewitz’ On War. Military Misfortunes is a study of how well-intentioned plans would go awry, and a caution to consider multiple factors when planning. Patai’s book offered insights into Arab culture, while On War stated that war is a “continuation of policy by other means”. My experiences during my time at war confirmed this adage, in spades.
What was it like, planning for war while dealing with senior leaders in Central Command headquarters, and the Pentagon?
Benson: In a theoretical world, planning proceeds in parallel with higher-level headquarters, as well as in collaboration with subordinate headquarters. The planning effort I experienced for what would become Operation Iraqi Freedom did not take place in the theoretical world (an understatement to be sure). True planning at the level where I served takes place in the space between military and policy requirements. My challenge was to sustain the energy required to complete a total major operations plan supporting the CENTCOM campaign plan while dealing with the demands of policy and policy makers from above, and commanders and staffs below our headquarters.
Kevin, where did the title come from?
Benson: The title was drawn from a letter GEN George Patton wrote to his son on D-Day 1944. He wrote, “TAKE CALCULATED RISKS. That is quite different from being rash. My personal belief is that if you have a 50% chance take it because the superior fighting qualities of American soldiers lead by me will surely give you the extra 1% necessary.” This is the expectation of valor.
Kevin Benson served in the U.S. Army as a commander and general staff officer for 30 years. He was the Director of Plans for Third U.S. Army and the Combined Forces Land Component Command at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, from July 2002 to July 2003. His final assignment was Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, at Fort Leavenworth, KS.
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