Logistics in the Falklands War

Kenneth L. Privratsky

 
Date Published :
February 2015
Publisher :
Pen and Sword
Language:
English
Illustration :
16pp b/w plates
Format Available    QuantityPrice
Binding. : Paperback
ISBN : 9781473899049
Pages : 304
Dimensions : 9 X 6 inches
Stock Status : In stock
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$24.95

Overview
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While many books have been written on the Falklands War, this is the first to focus on the vital aspect of logistics. The challenges were huge; the lack of preparation time; the urgency; the huge distances involved; the need to requisition ships from trade to name but four.

After a brief discussion of events leading to Argentina’s invasion the book describes in detail the rush to reorganize and deploy forces, dispatch a large task force, the innovative solutions needed to sustain the Task Force, the vital staging base at Ascension Island, the in-theater resupply, the setbacks and finally the restoring of order after victory.

Had the logistics plan failed, victory would have been impossible and humiliation inevitable, with no food for the troops, no ammunition for the guns, no medical support for casualties etc.

The lessons learnt have never been more important with increasing numbers of out-of-area operations required in remote trouble spots at short notice. The Falklands experience is crucial for the education of new generations of military planners and fascinating for military buffs and this book fills an important gap.

REVIEWS
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“With inadequate training, little intelligence, no contingency plan, a politically driven rush and at 8,000 miles, it is not surprising that logistics during Op CORPORATE were confusing and challenging. It has taken a US Army general to explain why. We should all be grateful.”

- Michael Clapp, Commander Amphibious Task Force

"a very accurate report about the course of ‘The Conflict’, like the British call it. The book gives a good insight in the decision process, at the Argentinian as well as at the British side, which lead to the armed battle of these islands. What interested me most is how the British came to it to decide, almost overnight, to begin a war and also, within 48 hours (promised by the British Navy) actually sailed out... a broad, interesting and subtle picture of the events that took place"

- Aviation Book Reviews

"highlights the importance of the integration of combat operations and logistics ..... argues convincingly that logistics was the center of gravity of the campaign... thorough research, including interviews leads to a comprehensive description of the combat operations and movement of supplies and equipment from the amphibious landing zone on the west shore of East Falkland on D-Day 21 May 1982, to the surrender on 14 June 1982... Privatsky's insights could also be applied to humanitarian affairs operations, especially if a natural disaster has destroyed piers or off loading equipment, or occurred in a remote location without pre positioned stores. Military operational planners and military history enthusiasts should add this book to their professional library"

- Naval War College Review, Spring 2016

"a timely book that explores the logistical challenges of projecting decisive combat power across transoceanic distances. As America’s Joint force explores new ways of leveraging technology to counter aggression from a distance, this book dispels any misunderstanding about the magnitude of the challenges that supplying war across great distances creates. At the end of the day, projecting and sustaining combat power for conflict and post-conflict operations is a logistical undertaking requiring foresight, planning, C2, and extensive logistical preparation of the battle space. A country’s operational reach is ultimately determined by its’ military effectiveness in projecting and sustaining combat power—which is all about logistics."

- Marine Corps Gazette

‘Logistics in the Falklands War’ is, in short, a thorough account of how the British hastily improvised a task force to recapture lost territory. It shows how doing that was achieved by coordinating civilian and military assets and integrating the civilian assets into a military organization; it reveals the complexities of managing logistics afloat and ashore and of integrating fundamentally different methodologies; finally, it demonstrates that expeditionary forces, in whatever environment they may deploy, must be self-sustaining, for the logistical line becomes more and more tenuous as the distance from the home base increases. As Privratsky presents the story, one may wonder at the British achievement but also draw discomforting lessons for the present.

- Australian Naval Institute

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