Eighth Army Versus Rommel is a riveting account of the Desert War from 1940 through Montgomery's celebrated battle of Alamein in 1942. Comprehensively researched and rich in previously unpublished material, it examines the undertrained and underfunded pre-war British Army, contrasting its leadership with its opposite numbers in Germany, and demonstrates how and why Eighth Army had difficulties in its first 18 months of fighting the Afrika Korps.

This volume also examines the battles from the perspective of the commanders, the decisions they made and how cultural influences effected tactics and decisions of the Eighth Army high command. Ultimately, British commanders were as much the product of their military culture and education as Rommel and his commanders were of theirs, but British military culture and education was, for much of this period, markedly less fit for purpose than the German. Saul David, Professor of Military History at the University of Buckingham and author of All the King's Men and 100 Days to Victory, describes it as: "A compelling and highly original study, firmly based on archival research, that explains for the first time the real reason the British and Commonwealth troops struggled to overcome their German and Italian opposition in the Desert War: not because of inadequate generals and equipment per se, but rather because of inherent weaknesses in British military culture."

"Colvin produced a well-researched, balanced account of the consequences of failing to adjust to battlefield conditions. His work contains detailed maps that enhance understanding. His explanations on the importance of doctrine to successfully train and employ forces are superb. The author’s comments on maneuver, firepower and massing of forces by both sides is worthy of review and study."

"[Colvin] gives good accounts of the planning and execution of numerous operations, with an emphasis on how they were perceived by the various commanders and how the internal tensions in the officer corps handicapped the development of effective tactics and proper command and control."

I find it depressing that Britain had to wait half the war until it found an effective senior commander in Montgomery. This excellent book unpicks the reasons behind this. […] Good maps, good text, much research, and a balanced analysis.